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Governance Issues in the Principal-Agent Framework: Producing Cellulosic Ethanol in 
Michigan 
(Vivek Pandey, Aleksan Shanoyan,  Brent Ross) 
 
This article analyzes the incentives and compensation problems faced by cellulosic ethanol 
producer and logging firms and the consequent impact on the organization of the wood based 
cellulosic ethanol industry in the US. The success of this relationship is central to setting up the 
biofuel industry in Michigan and in the US at large. The theoretical results indicate that 
specification contract under the principal-agent framework is of limited utility due to’ metering’ 
problem when the principal contracts with multiple agents for the supply of feedstock.. 
Alternative arrangements including JVs have the potential to provide close to first best solutions.   
 
1)  Introduction 
Biofuels are being extensively promoted for their potential to contribute to energy security, 
stable energy prices, and climate change mitigation in the United States (Khanna, 2008). Within 
the category of biofuels, corn based ethanol production has long been supported in the United 
States. Over 7.5 billion gallons of ethanol was produced in 2008 from the corn grown over 90 
million acres of farm land (Donner & Kucharik, 2008). However there has been a recent policy 
shift mandating the increase in production of cellulosic ethanol from being currently insignificant 
to 21 billion gallons a year in 2022 (EISA, 2007). This article analyzes the incentives and 
compensation problems faced by wood based cellulosic ethanol producer and the logging firms 
(they supply feedstock) and the consequent impact on the organization of the wood based 
cellulosic ethanol industry in the US. We propose to study this problem under the principal-agent   3 
framework. This would allow us to introduce asymmetric information and its impact on the 
vertical coordination strategy (Macho-Stadler, 2001). 
 
The US biofuel policy is comprised of tax credits for biofuel blenders and production mandates 
(a renewable fuel standard) authorized in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 and the Energy 
Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA, 2007). The new Renewable Fuel Standard 
requires the use of at least 36 billion gallons of biofuels per year in 2022.  The law seeks to limit 
the impact of corn based ethanol (defined as conventional biofuels or first generation biofuels) in 
the RFS by limiting its production to 15 billion gallons a year after 2015 and encouraging the use 
of cellulosic ethanol which are defined as advanced or second generation biofuels. The advanced 
biofuels on a life cycle analysis basis must encompass 50 per cent less green house gas emissions 
(GHG) than the gasoline or diesel fuel it will replace. The second generation biofuels include 
fuel made from cellulosic materials, hemi cellulose, lignin, sugar, starch (excluding corn), and 
waste, as well as biomass-based biodiesel, biogas, and other fuels from cellulosic biomass 
(Velasco, 2008) 
 
First generation biofuels processes are useful but limited. There is a threshold beyond which 
additional production cannot take place without jeopardizing food supplies (example: corn and 
sugarcane) and biodiversity (Kish, 2007). They are not cost competitive with fossil fuels and 
green house gas emission savings are small. There has been a recent growing interest in second 
generation cellulosic biofuels due to their enhanced potential to contribute to energy security and 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 85% while mitigating the food vs. fuel competition for land 
as compared to corn ethanol (Khanna, 2009).    4 
Cellulosic ethanol (CE) production has the advantage of abundant and diverse raw material 
compared to sources like corn and sugar cane. Major sources for CE include switch grass, 
miscanthus and wood (example: aspen, poplar and willow). Cellulose is present in almost every 
natural free-growing plant, tree, and bush all over the world without agricultural effort or cost 
needed to make it grow.  
 
Problem Statement 
The cellulosic content contained in the log of woods is the major source of cellulosic ethanol. 
Once the tree has been uprooted, the cellulosic content goes down with time. Therefore the 
ethanol producer would be willing that the landing operations (defined as carrying of logs of 
wood from the logging site to storage site) are completed by the loggers as soon as the tree has 
been cut. The problem arises in winters when snow affects the logging operations. Landing 
becomes difficult because the same task requires more resources to be spent by the logging firm 
(more men and better machines for transporting the wood to the landing area). This gives rise to 
conflict between the principal (CE producer) and the agent (logging firm). It has been estimated 
that an uprooted tree looses 60% of the cellulosic content if the wood is left unprocessed for 10 
days (Maser et. al., 1988). This will adversely affect the ethanol production and also the 
principal’s revenue. In short, moral hazard and adverse selection problems are anticipated in the 
contractual relationship between the CE producer and the logging firm. 
 
The moral-hazard problem usually is formulated in terms of a contract between a principal and 
an agent who “works” for him. The principal and the agent can be people or institutions. With 
regards to agricultural sharecropping, the principal is the landowner and the agent is the tenant.   5 
In the moral-hazard problem, the agent works on a project for the principal. The amount of work 
the agent performs affects the probability distribution of the project’s return. The problem is that 
the principal cannot monitor the agent’s work, so the agent’s effort is private information; that is, 
it is observed only by the agent himself (Prescott, 1997). In some models, the agent’s amount of 
effort is not observed. In other models, precisely how the task is performed is not observed. 
Adverse selection is present when the agent has informational advantage concerning his own 
personal characteristics and will only be revealed if it is in the interest of the agent to do so.  
 
The wood based cellulosic industry has to yet take off on commercial scale. In that respect, we 
would consider our study to be futuristic. We strongly anticipate that the findings of the study 
would be particularly useful for the firms and organizations planning to invest in the cellulosic 
ethanol production facilities. The theoretical results indicate that specification contract under the 
principal-agent framework is of limited utility due to’ metering’ problem when the principal 
contracts with multiple agents for the supply of feedstock.. Alternative arrangements including 
JVs have the potential to provide close to first best solutions.   
 
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the methodology used in our research. We 
develop the conceptual framework in section 3 for analyzing the behavior of agents under 
symmetric and asymmetric information cases. In section 4 we discuss the optimal contracting 
schemes under asymmetric information where some options are proposed and analyzed. We 
conclude our discussion in section 5. 
 
   6 
2)   Methodology 
We make use of the case study methodology in analyzing the governance issues arising from the 
principal-agent relationship between the ethanol producer and the feedstock provider. The case 
uses the example of Michigan. The state of Michigan has the 5
th largest timberland in the US and 
it grows 2.5 times more wood fiber annually than it harvests (Pedersen, 2005). Michigan has 
enough resources to support 6 commercial facilities each producing 50 million gallons of ethanol 
per year. 
 
 The Mascoma Corporation is planning to build the first CE production facility in Michigan. The 
plant will be located in the Chippewa province, Upper Peninsula (Egan, 2009). The ethanol 
facility will require 375 thousand cords of wood every year to manufacture 40 million gallons of 
biofuel. Wood will come mainly from within a radius of 150 miles from the plant’s site. This 
largely rural area includes both state and federal forests, Interstate 75 and access to the Mackinac 
Bridge, which puts forests in the northern Lower Peninsula within reach. So too are the forests of 
northern Ontario, via Sault Ste. Marie’s international crossing with Canada.  
 
Michigan has about 800 logging firms. Most loggers are independent contractors and run their 
family businesses. Loggers are supposed to possess many skills which include logging, 
maintaining their equipments, forestry know-how, accounting, and be able to work with the 
private forest owners. It is a hard job with many risks. While there are many combinations of 
equipments, a common set-up includes a feller-buncher and skidder. A feller-buncher is a large 
machine that has big cutter on the end of a mechanical arm. The cutter holds the trees at once and   7 
places it in small piles, where they are cut into logs by people with chainsaws. Skidder is used to 
pull whole trees to a collecting point called landings.  
 
2.1)  Actors 
There are primarily two actors in the production of ethanol- the ethanol producer and the logging 
firm. The ethanol producer processes the wood logs into ethanol by using an enzymatic process. 
The producer designs a contract for procuring the wood from the logging firms in Upper 
Peninsula. The contract would typically carry quality and compensation details. The loggers 
generally don’t own the timberland and the trees. They buy the trees from the forest land owners 
by paying the stumpage (price of the standing timber, before trees are harvested).  
 
The prices paid for a specific stand of timber will vary considerably due to such factors as size, 
species, quality, logging conditions, distance to the mill, end product, demand and competition. 
Timber markets often change rapidly. The timberland owners generally obtain assistance from 
professional foresters and use the competitive bidding process as the ultimate determinant of fair 
market value for any specific tract of timber (Michigan DNRE, 2010). In the case of procuring 
wood for ethanol, logging conditions and distance to the processing facility would be the key 
factor for stumpage price determination.  
 
The next task of the loggers is to ship the wood to a landing area. A landing area is a small 
clearing where loggers gather the logs. The landing area is owned and operated by the logging 
companies. At the landings, the truckers hired by the ethanol producer, pick up the logs. 
Operators can load an entire truck with about 15 to 20 cords ( cord is a pile of eight-foot logs (or   8 
100" pulpsticks) that is four feet tall and four feet wide) in less than 60 minutes. Logs are then 
chained into place so that they don’t shift during transport to the processing facility.  
 
The prices paid for a specific stand of timber will vary considerably due to such factors as size, 
species, and quality, logging conditions, distance to the mill, end product, demand and 
competition. Timber markets often change rapidly. The timberland owners generally obtain 
assistance from professional foresters and use the competitive bidding process as the ultimate 
determinant of fair market value for any specific tract of timber (Michigan DNRE, 2010). In the 
case of procuring wood for ethanol, logging conditions and distance to the processing facility 
would be the key factor for stumpage price determination.  
 
2.2) Potential Problems  
 
2.2.1) Moral Hazard Problem 
Delay in landing operations is very common in the winter season when the snowfall makes it 
operations difficult and costly. The additional equipments include snow removers to clear the 
road for transportation (very few logging firms have their own snow removal vehicles) and hire 
more number of loggers to perform the same task. The total fuel and labor cost is high during 
winters. Hence higher effort implies higher disutility for the logger. However the effort of the 
agent is not verifiable. A number of factors contribute to non-verifiability of the effort of the 
logging firm. This includes the spatial nature of operations, the complex procedure involved in 
the logging and landing operations and humungous monitoring cost.  
   9 
Effort is not observed hence it cannot be included in the contract. The observed variable is 
output, in cases where the ethanol producer is contracting with a single logging firm. Hence 
contract can be set based on output realized, i.e., output stands as proxy for effort with a good 
amount of consistency. The problem becomes more complex when multiple agents are involved. 
The principal can only observe the group output due to the lumpy nature of the production 
process. However, for purpose of compensation and to incentivize the agents to provide high 
effort marginal output is necessary information but it is not known.  
 
2.2.2) Adverse Selection Problem 
 Ethanol producer is expected to contract with multiple loggers. This gives rise to adverse 
selection problem due to inability of the principal to observe the agent type. On a day when 
snowfall is heavy, the agents are required to exert very high levels of effort to perform the 
landing operations instantly, in order to avoid the fall of cellulosic content. This means greater 
disutility for the agent. 
 
 Agents are aware of the fact that is not possible for the principal to make an approximation of 
the agent’s effort by visualizing the logs of wood supplied by them because principal observes 
only total output. Hence they have incentives to delay the landing operations and instead supply 
the fresher logs to nearby factories for example-paper and pulp industry, furniture firms etc. 
because in these industries, the agent’s effort can be ascertained by visualizing and touching the 
wood (Green & Ross, 1997). In the background of this information, the low ability loggers 
(defined as those with lower logging skills and lesser equipments and employees) would self-  10 
select themselves in the ethanol industry. We would formally show that how this would 
adversely affect the principal’s utility function.  
 
3) The Conceptual Framework 
This section presents the analysis of various contractual schemes between the ethanol producer 
and the logging firm(s) in the principal-agent framework. We begin by explaining the source of 
tension between the principal and agent followed by a discussion of the model under symmetric 
information. Then we examine the case of asymmetric information, the incentive mechanism 
under the first best solution, and the optimal contract design in the presence of moral hazard and 
adverse selection problems. 
 
3.1)  Elements of the Problem 
The cellulosic ethanol producer is the principal who contracts the agent to supply wood. The 
prime objective of the principal and the agent is to maximize their respective utility functions. 
Their utility function can be expressed as follows: 
 
(1) Principal’s utility function:  B[R(c(t)) - w] 
 
(2) Agent’s utility function: U(w, e) =  u(w) – v(e) 
 
R(c (t)): denotes the revenue from the sale of ethanol is function of the cellulosic content in the 
wood which in turn is dependent on time taken t taken in landing operations after the tree has 
been cut.    11 
w: compensation received by the agent. 
e: agent’s effort exerted during logging and landing.  
v (.): disutility from a particular level of effort.  
 
For the sake of simplicity, we assume a single-shot game and just two effort levels: high effort 
and low effort. Hence e ε (e
H , e
L) and that disutility from higher effort is more than disutility 




The agent is interested in w, which is cost to the principal, whereas the principal is interested in 
higher levels of e, because high e implies higher cellulose content and hence higher R, but high e 
translates into higher disutility for the agent. This explains the source of conflict in the 
relationship.  
 
Outcome does not only depend entirely on logger’s effort but also on random factors which are 
beyond the control of the logger. A partial list of such factors includes forestry practices of the 
landowner, specie harvested, weather, technological constraints, ethanol demand etc. Hence, we 
can attach probability values to each type of effort that can result into various levels of revenue 
for the principal. This is formally expressed as: 
Pr[R=Ri | e] = pi(e) for i ε (1, 2, 3,…..,n).  
 
3.2) Base Model 
The base model is the perfect or symmetric information model. The principal and the agent share 
the same level of information with respect to the variables and functions determining the   12 
relationship (such as production function, or the distribution of the random variable) and with 
respect to identities (both know the utility function of the other) and behavior relevant to the 
relationship. It implies that the principal can observe the effort exerted by the agent without any 
positive monitoring cost. Whatever informational asymmetries may exist, they are common for 
both the players.  
 
The bargaining relationship between the ethanol producer and the logging firm is presented 
graphically in the figure 3.1 
 
Figure 3.1 The Order of Moves under Symmetric Information 
 
 
When the logging and landing effort is verifiable and the output is observable, the ethanol 
producer’s decision process can be modeled as the following maximization problem: 
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 U  is the logger’s reservation utility and equals the utility from the compensation he receives in 
the other wood based industry like paper and pulp producing firms or the furniture industry. 
  
The optimal contract under the symmetric information would be fixed payments depending on 
the effort level observed by the ethanol producer. We derive the following solution after having 
set up the lagrangian function of the above maximization problems and then finding the first 
order conditions with respect to effort e and compensation w: 
[ ] ) (
1 e u w H
H v U + =
−  
The producer would offer w
H for high effort and w
L = 0 for low effort in order to incentivize the 
logger to provide higher effort. 
 
3.3) Model under Asymmetric Information (Contracting with only One Agent) 
One can think of the situations that deviate from the symmetric information case. Informational 
asymmetries can arise due to agent’s behavior during the relationship. We have already 
discussed such a scenario in section 4 where the ethanol producer cannot observe the effort of the 
logging firm to ensure timely logging and landing operations. As a result the principal cannot 
distinguish between suboptimal outputs caused due to factors beyond the control of the agent or 
due to agent’s opportunistic behavior i.e. lower effort is exerted on a snowy day in order to bring 
down operations cost.  
 
We have graphically represented the relationship between the logging firm and the ethanol 
producer under asymmetric information graphically in the figure 3.2 
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The extent to which the agent deviates from the principal’s desired level of effort can be captured 
by the variable L, which is defined as the portion of cellulose lost due to delay in landings. If 
agent puts high effort then L=0 with probability ) ( H H e R P Ι , and if agent exerts low effort, then 
0<L<1. 
 
Under the present scenario if the principal gives fixed wagew, to the agent, the payoff functions 
for the agent: 
) ( ) ( e EU
H H v w u − =  
) ( ) ( e EU
L L v w u − =  
Since v(e
H) > v(e
L), the agent will choose the lower level of effort. In that case, the utility of the 
principal is [ ] w L c R B − − ) 1 ( * ) (  . Hence, we have the moral hazard problem if we impose the 
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3.4) Model under Asymmetric Information (Contracting with Multiple Agents) 
While contracting with multiple loggers, there are three sources of information asymmetry (i) the 
non-verifiable agents’ effort and (ii) the type of agent and (iii) the marginal output. In addition to 
moral hazard, the principal faces adverse selection problem when principal deals with multiple 
agents.  
 
 Vast quantities of wood are logged by foresters to provide fibers (for pulp, paper products, and 
boards), and saw timber (for house building and furniture). The processors of these wood based 
products are concerned with the tensile strength of the wood that is, lignin content. Lignin is a 
glue-like polymer in the cell wall of plants that surrounds cellulose to provide strength to fibers 
and to resist microbial decay.  The hardness of the wood can be approximately ascertained 
through visual observation. The monitoring cost in such industries is hence not very high.  As a 
result, the low type firms would find it difficult to have contractual arrangements with the fiber 
and timber processors.  
 
 The ethanol producer is concerned with the cellulosic content in the wood. They don’t need 
strong trees because lignin is difficult to break down for cellulose extraction and requires 
chemical pretreatment (Chiang et. al., 2010). Chemical pretreatment raises the cost for using the 
wood as the source of cellulose. It is not possible to examine the cellulose content outside the 
laboratory. Therefore the agent’s output is not observed. Moreover compensation to the logger 
must be equal or greater than the existing levels. Hence, the low type agent has the incentive to 
self select himself in the contractual relationship with the ethanol producer.  
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The general scheme of the game that we will be analyzing is shown in figure 3.3. 
 
Figure 3.3 The order of moves under Asymmetric Information (Contracting with Multiple 
Agents) 
 
The application of first best or Pareto efficient solution in this case will lead to twin problems of 
moral hazard and adverse selection. The payoff functions of the ethanol producer and the logger 
under the status quo are summarized in Figure 3.4  EU and EB denote the expected utilities of 
the logging firm and the producer respectively with subscripts denoting the type of the agent 
(High, Low) and the superscripts denoting the effort level (High, Low). 
 
From the figure 3.4, it is evident that the ethanol producer will prefer to contract with high type 
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4) Optimal Contract under Asymmetric Information 
 
4.1) Contracting with One Agent 
The agent’s effort is not verifiable but the output is observable. Hence, the wage is not fixed, but 
is some function of output R. The principal would solve following maximization problem: 
High 
Agent’s type 
Agent’s effort level 
Low 
Low  High   18 
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PC is the participation constraint, through which the principal ensures that the agent accepts the 
contract by paying him at least the reservation wage. IC is the incentive compatibility constraint 
through which the principal incentivizes the agent to choose the high effort over low effort. Here 
we have assumed that monitoring cost to be zero. 
 
In the repeated game, the principal can induce the agent not to defect from the high effort 
strategy by paying efficiency wages w* (Moretti and Preloff, 2002). Efficiency wages are the 
wages above the market-clearing wage which is paid in order to provide incentives to the agent 
to provide higher level of efforts. The efficiency wage would increase the cost of defection for 
the agent and hence he would comply with the decision of the principal. 
 
4.2) Contracting with multiple agents 
Total output is observed but not the marginal output. This is not team production but the 
complexity of the production process gives rise to metering problem (Alchian and Demsetz, 
1972). In the principal agent setup, the final output produced by individual agent is essential to   19 
determine the compensation that should be made to individual agent. Since, effort cannot be 
linked to output, the optimal contract design is not possible. Prohibitive monitoring cost renders 
the payment of efficiency wages ineffective and it only adds to the cost of the principal. The 
probability of getting caught is very low hence the agents find it profitable to defect from the 
cooperation strategy. 
 
The argument presented here is that moving away from specification contract towards vertical 
integration, for instance, joint venture, helps in solving the problem efficiently by correcting the 
incentives mechanism. If few of the big logging firms were to form a cooperative to supply wood 
and also have equity in the ethanol refinery, it is easier to ensure that the interest of both the 
parties is become aligned.  
 
McAfee and McMillan (1991) work on optimal contracts for teams suggest that a team subject to 
both adverse selection and moral hazard, optimal contracts are linear in output under certain 
conditions. They conclude that the outcome is same whether the principal observes just the total 
output or each individual’s contribution. Thus monitoring is not needed to prevent shirking by 
team members; instead the role of monitoring is to discipline the monitor.  
 
Holmstrom (1982) showed that in team production under moral hazard, the principal can ensure 
a full information outcome by offering a contract that punishes each team member arbitrarily 
severely whenever team output falls below some target. However, this seems an impractical 
method of solving moral hazard. Moreover, for our purpose the principal cannot disentangle an 
agent’s effort from his ability.    20 
 
In the special case where agents’ type is common knowledge, the moral hazard problem can be 
completely solved. The principal is needed to adjust the incentive constraint such that any 
increase in the marginal product is distributed among all the agents. This will give each agent 
enough incentive to exert desired effort. However principal’s variable costs will increase. This 
can be easily counteracted in the linear form of the contract. The fixed part of the payments is 
negative in order to account for increase in the principal’s cost.   
 
The changed relationship would greatly reduce the monitoring costs and each member would get 
the share in the group compensation and not individual compensation and they would pay a fixed 
amount to the ethanol producer which will indicate t. The problem is hence again reduced to 
when principal contracts with one agent- the Loggers’ Cooperative. Interestingly, Mascoma 
Corporation has already entered into a joint venture with JM Longyear, a forest management and 
logging company. JML has 25% interest in the joint venture.   
 
5) Possibility of Further Work 
There is immense literature on optimal contracting when more than one agent is hired by the 
principal to perform task(s). The implicit assumption is: the marginal productivity is observed by 
the principal. The investigation of the scenarios in which metering of individual output is not 
possible, would be an important addition to the literature and would also  find relevant 
application in fields where group production is an important element in the relationship. Apart 
from conducting case studies analyzing the possible outcomes of such a relationship, there would   21 
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